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1. Introduction
Causal claims can be divided into two kinds – singular (token) and general (type). For
instance, we claim generally that heating butter causes it to melt and, regarding a single case,
that the heat that I applied to the butter in my kitchen yesterday evening caused it to melt. One
of the central puzzles about the nature of causation concerns the relationship between these
sorts of claims and the causal relations that underlie them. There seem to be two main options.
What I shall call the generalist view holds that singular causal relations obtain because they are
instances of a general causal regularity or law. What makes it true that the heat I applied to the
butter last night caused it to melt is that there is a general causal law that whenever butter is
heated past a certain point it will melt. What I shall call the singularist view holds the converse
position. Singular causal relations can obtain even if they are not instances of causal regularities
or laws, and what makes causal generalizations true, when they are true, is that they correctly
describe a pattern of singular instances of causally related events. It is a basic fact that last night
my heating the butter caused it to melt, and the general claim that heating butter causes it to
melt is true only because it happens that in most or all of the individual cases, heating butter
causes it to melt. To put the matter succinctly, the generalist holds that general causal relations
make singular causal claims true, while the singularist holds that singular causal relations that
make general causal claims true. 1

*

Forthcoming in Causality in the Sciences, edited by Phyllis McKay Illari, Renee Russo and Jon
Williamson. Oxford: Oxford University Press
1

Two other papers which explicitly discuss the relationship between singular and general causal
claims are (Hitchcock 1995) and (Russo and Williamson 2009). What I call singularist and generalist

1

My aim in this paper is to make a case for the singularist view from the perspective of a
mechanical theory of causation (Glennan 1996, 1997, 2010, forthcoming), and to explain what,
from this perspective, causal generalizations mean, and what role they play within the
mechanical theory. Prior to making this argument, it is important to clarify the relationship
between the singularist/generalist distinction and another distinction widely discussed in the
contemporary literature on causality. It is now commonly held that there are two concepts of
cause– or at least that our causal assertions make two different sorts of claims (Hall 2004,
Hitchcock 2007, Godfrey-Smith 2010, Glennan forthcoming). On the one hand, causes are said
to produce or bring about effects. On the other hand, causes are said to depend upon, be
relevant to, or make a difference to their effects. The case for thinking of these concepts as
distinct is that there appear to be instances in which something can be a cause in one of these
senses and fail to be a cause in the other. Two phenomena that illustrate this point are
overdetermination and causation by omission. A paradigmatic example of overdetermination is
a prisoner being executed by firing squad. In such a case a particular soldier’s shot produces a
wound that causes death, but the soldier’s shot does make a difference to the prisoner’s death
because the other soldiers’ shots were each sufficient to cause the death. Had the first soldier’s
shot not hit the prisoner, the prisoner still would have died. In cases of causation by omission,
on the other hand, we appear to have causes that make a difference but that are not
productive. Suppose I rear-end a car because I fail to brake. In such a case my failure to brake
clearly made a difference to the occurrence of the accident. Had I braked, I would not have hit
the car. But my omission cannot be said to have produced the collision, because my omission is
not, properly speaking, an event or occurrence. What produced the collision was the forward
momentum of my car, which was produced by my earlier pressing of the accelerator.
In what follows, I shall refer to these two concepts of cause as productivity and relevance.
The significance of the productivity/relevance distinction for our discussion of singular and
general causes is that the singularist view seems to fit more naturally with the productivity

approaches, Russo and Williamson call bottom-up and top-down strategies and Hitchcock calls Humean
(or neo-Humean) and generalization approaches. A third option holds that the truth of singular and
general causal claims are independent of each other. This position has been argued for principally by Eells
(1991). I shall not discuss this position directly, but I hope to argue indirectly against it by providing a
singularist account that addresses the concerns that motivate it .
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approach, while the generalist view seems to more naturally make sense of relevance or
difference-making. The connection between these two distinctions is evident in an early paper
by Sober(1984) that makes a case for there being two concepts of cause. Sober’s two concepts
of cause are not causal productivity and causal relevance but are rather token causation and
property (or type) causation. Nonetheless, Sober makes the case that token and type causation
are distinct by appealing to the difference between productivity and relevance. Sober does this
in the context of probabilistic theories of causality. Most probabilistic theories of causality are
type-level difference-making accounts. Probabilistic theories of causality typically assert that
causes must raise the probabilities of their effects. The standard problem for difference-making
accounts is that there appear to be singular causal processes in which events that lower the
probability of an outcome nonetheless are productively connected to the effect – sometimes
called the problem of “doing it the hard way.” Many of these examples involve golf balls and
squirrels. Suppose I have hit a putt that is heading cleanly toward the hole and there is a high
probability of the ball going in. As the ball roles towards the hole, a squirrel runs up and kicks it
off its path, but fortuitously the ball ricochets off an acorn that has just dropped to the green
and bounces into the hole. Sober argues that the correct way to analyze this case is to argue
that “the kind of kick” the squirrel made is a type-level negative cause of holing putts, in the
sense that such kicks are negatively probabilistically relevant to holing putts, but that the
particular squirrel kick is a token cause of holing this particular putt, because the particular
process by which the putt made it to the hole “traces back” to the squirrel’s kick.
Notwithstanding Sober’s argument, causal relevance is not essentially a property or typelevel notion. Difference-making can be understood in the single case by appeal to
counterfactuals. The case of omission discussed above is an example of just such a case. When
I say that my failure to brake was causally relevant to my rear-ending the car, I am talking about
an omission that made a difference in a particular case. But while intuitive appeal to
counterfactuals allows us to make sense of singular causal relevance claims, it remains to be
seen whether we can understand these singular counterfactuals in a way that does not implicitly
make reference to general causal claims. The central claim of this paper is that the mechanical
theory will provide a way to meet this challenge.
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In the next section of the paper we will review some traditional arguments for and against
singularism. The remainder of the paper is concerned with describing the relationship between
three sorts of theories of causation: process theories, mechanical theories and manipulability
theories. In section three we will see how process theories provide a singularist account of
causal relations, but in so doing fail to capture relations of causal relevance. In section four, I
introduce mechanical theories, seeing how they contrast with process theories, particularly in
regard to their treatment of causal relevance. In section five, I examine the relationship
between mechanical theories and manipulability theories. The upshot of this examination is
that the two sorts of theories should not be thought of as competitors but as describing
different aspects of the nature of causal relation. In the final section of the paper I make the
case that the mechanical theory as it has been developed in the previous sections really
supports a singularist metaphysics.

2. Preliminary Arguments for and Against Singularism
The modern singularist view begins as a reaction to Hume’s regularity theory of causation.
Hume’s belief that all knowledge of matters of fact derives ultimately from impressions,
combined with his view that we have no impression of a necessary connection in a single case,
leads to his view that singular causal claims are true because they are instances of regular
patterns of association. So, for instance, billiard ball a’s striking billiard ball b causes billiard ball
b to move, because (1) billiard ball a did strike billiard ball b, (2) billiard ball b did start to move,
and (3) ceteris paribus, whenever one billiard ball strikes another, the second begins to move.
The motivation for his regularity theory is essentially epistemological and pragmatic. Singular
causal sequences are instances of regular causal sequences, because, unless a singular causal
sequence is an instance of a regular causal sequence, it would be impossible to recognize it as
causal. Moreover, if cause-effect sequences are instances of regularities, then it is possible to
predict and control effects by observing or manipulating their regular causes.
Two of the most widely discussed singularist critiques of Hume come from Ducasse ([1926]
1993) and Anscombe ([1971] 1993). Both reject the epistemological strictures that suggest it is
not possible to observe causal relations in the single case. Ducasse argues that the problem
arises from Hume’s presumption that the connection between causally related events was some
third entity, analogous to the relata. He writes:
4

Hume’s view that no connection between a cause and its effect is objectively observable
would be correct only under the assumption that a ‘connection’ is an entity of the same sort
as the terms themselves between which it holds, that is, for Hume and his followers, a sense
impression. … [But] the fact is the causal connection is not a sensation at all, but a relation.
… We observe it whenever we perceive that a certain change is the only one to have taken a
place immediately before, in the immediate environment of another(Ducasse [1926] 1993).
In describing causality as a relation, Ducasse is suggesting that it is a relation like contiguity.
When we observe two people sitting beside each other, we do not observe the first person, the
second person and some third thing – “besideness”, but rather we just observe that the first
person is beside the second person. Similarly, Ducasse argues, when one event causes a second,
we observe the first event, the second event, and the fact that they are causally related.
Anscombe’s argument is Wittgensteinian in character. People learn to use a variety of
specific causal concepts – her examples are “scrape, push, wet, carry, eat burn, knock over, keep
off, squash, make (e.g., noises, paper boats), hurt” (Anscombe [1971] 1993: 93). Only when one
has mastered specific causal concepts is one able to master the highly general concept of cause.
Moreover, mastery of causal concepts is essentially connected with mastery of the use of words
describing objects and events:
If we care to imagine languages in which no special causal concepts are represented,
then no description of the use of a word in such languages will be able to present it as
meaning cause. Nor will it even contain words for natural kinds of stuff, nor yet words
equivalent to ‘body’, ‘wind’, or ‘fire’. For learning to use special causal verbs is part and
parcel of learning to apply the concepts answering to these and many other
substantives. As surely as we learned to call people by name or report from seeing it
that a cat was on the table, we also learned to report from having observed it that
someone drank up the milk or that the dog made a funny noise or that things were cut
or broken by whatever we saw cut or break them (ibid.).
This picture is Wittgensteinian in the sense that it eschews what Wittgenstein in the
Philosophical Investigations called the Augustinian picture, in which words are tags that are
hung on things that one “observes”. For Anscombe, like for Wittgenstein, acquisition of a
concept involves mastery of certain techniques. These techniques are parts of language games
in which a variety of words – nouns, verbs and other kinds – are connected to behaviors and
social practices. There is no “observation” apart from mastery of these techniques, and once
such mastery is achieved, observation of causal connections is no more or less problematic than
observations of the objects that enter into them.
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These arguments about how causal knowledge is acquired are helpful to the singularist’s
case but not decisive. The singularist’s position is a metaphysical rather than an epistemological
one, and the possibility of acquiring singular causal knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient
for establishing this metaphysical position. Davidson’s position, for instance, is that Ducasse
was correct that it was possible to know that a singular causal relation obtained without
knowledge of a general causal law, but that the fact that a singular causal relation obtained
entailed that there exists some law, even if we do not know what it is([1967] 1993: 84-5).
Both Anscombe and Ducasse believe however that there are metaphysical or conceptual
grounds for singularism. Anscombe’s singularism stems from an observation she finds
so obvious as to seem trite…. Causality consists in the derivedness of an effect from its
causes . This is the core, the common feature, of causality in its various kinds. Effects
derive from, arise out of, come of, their causes. For example, everyone will grant that
physical parenthood is a causal relation. Here the derivation is material, by fission. Now
analysis in terms of necessity or universality does not tell us of this derivedness of the
effect; rather it forgets about that (Anscombe [1971] 1993: 92)
Anscombe here articulates the productive conception of cause. The fetus was produced by the
interaction of one egg and one sperm, and the arrival of the baby in the world was produced by
the act of labor. It may be the case that this is how all babies are conceived and most babies
come into the world, but these general facts need not be true for the singular causal claims to
hold. Greek myths tell us that the goddess Athena had a most unusual birth – springing fully
armored from Zeus’ head after Hephaestus cracked it open with an axe. The story is doubtless
false, but there is nothing inconceivable in such a singular birth; the fact that in general
whacking heads with axes is not a way to produce children does not entail that the story of
Athena’s birth is wrong. Ducasse echoes this point about the relation between singular causal
claims and causal generalizations:
… [T]he cause of a particular event [is defined] in terms of but a single occurrence of it,
and thus in no way involves the supposition that it, or one like it, ever has occurred
before or ever will again. The supposition of recurrence is thus wholly irrelevant to the
meaning of cause; that supposition is relevant only to the meaning of law. And
recurrence becomes related at all to causation only when a law is considered which
happens to be a generalization of facts themselves individually causal to begin with
(Ducasse [1926] 1993: 129)
While Ducasse and Anscombe have made a strong case for the singularist intuition, in my view
neither of them has provided an adequate explanation of just what this singular causal
relationship is. Ducasse does offer a reductive definition of cause, but, for reasons I shall not
6

explore, it seems wholly inadequate. Anscombe does not attempt to define what she means by
determination. Presumably this is because she feels that this relation is both unanalysable and
directly observable. While I do not doubt that in an ordinary sense we are quite capable of
observing causal relationships, I do not think Anscombe’s conclusion will do. While our
conception of causality may originate in our typically successful observations of ordinary things
pushing and scraping, identifying causal relationships can be far more complex. In the first
place, there are circumstances – like magic shows – where our observations of ordinary causal
relationships can be quite off the mark. Secondly, we often make causal inferences without
observing a causal relation – as when we infer from a patient’s symptoms that they have
interacted with an infectious agent. An advocate of a singularist approach must then say
something more about the nature of the causal relation.
While the arguments of Anscombe and Ducasse provide prima facie grounds for
doubting Hume’s view and for adopting a singularist perspective, the singularist perspective
faces some important difficulties. Hitchcock (1995), discusses one difficulty, which concerns the
semantic relationship between singular and general causal claim. What Hitchcock calls the
generalization strategy supposes that singular causal claims are basic, and that general causal
claims should be analyzed as generalizations over these singular causal claims. For instance, the
general causal claim that smoking causes cancer is true because it generalizes over true singular
causal claims – that Emily’s smoking caused her to get cancer, that Edward’s smoking cause him
to get cancer, and so on. The problem with this strategy is there is not a simple relationship
between generalizations and their instances. In probabilistic causal generalizations it is too
strong to suppose that every instance of the singular causal relation obtain. Notwithstanding
the general causal connection, not all who smoke get lung cancer. Perhaps one might treat a
generalization like this as an existential one, but Hitchcock argues that there are true causal
generalizations that have no instances. His example (ibid.: 265) is that eating one kilogram of
uranium 235 causes death. This generalization, he claims, “is true in virtues of certain features
of human physiology and the physics of nuclear chain reactions; however, no one has ever died
in this unusual way and it is unlikely that anyone ever will.” (ibid.). Hitchcock’s example cannot
be analyzed either as:
(x)(x’s ingesting 1kg of U235 causes x to die)
or
7

(∃x)(x’s ingesting 1kg of U235 causes x to die)
Both of these claims are false because no one has ingested 1kg of U235.
I would argue here that while Hitchcock’s objection undercuts a natural sort of analysis
of the relationship between singular and general causal claims, it doesn’t undermine singularism
as such. The problem here though doesn’t have to do with singularism but with the fact that
general causal claims have counterfactual import. Hitchcock’s example is plausibly analyzed as:
(x)(if x were to ingest 1kg of U235, x’s ingesting 1kg of U235 would cause x to die)
The singularist can maintain that the truth of this general counterfactual claim would depend
upon the truth of singular counterfactual claims – for instance, that if Emily were to ingest 1kg
of U235 her ingesting it would cause her to die.
Russo and Williamson (2009) raise an epistemological objection to singularism, arguing
that the singularist (or as they call it, the bottom-up) causal metaphysics is hard to square with
actual practices of inference in the sciences. They divide the sorts of evidence available into
evidence of (singular) mechanisms and evidence of (general) difference-making, and claim that
in the health sciences at least to establish a cause one must have evidence of both types. There
argument is based upon the analysis of causal inference in the case of autopsy:
To determine that Alf’s heart attack was a cause of his death, the medical practitioner
needs to have evidence both that there is a viable biological mechanism linking heartattack and death and that the heart attack made a difference to his death. … At the
generic level, in order to establish that pneumonia is a cause of death in hospital
patients, those conducting an academic autopsy need to be aware of evidence both of a
mechanism linking pneumonia and death, and that pneumonia makes a significant
difference to death in the population in question. … The proponent of the mechanistic
analysis cannot explain why, in cases where there is excellent mechanistic evidence,
evidence of difference-making is also required.
Contrary to Russo and Williamson, I think the mechanistic analysis can easily explain why
evidence of difference-making is required. In their first case, the “viable biological mechanism
linking heart attack and death” is a generic description of a mechanism. Not all heart attacks
cause death. Whether one does depends upon the details of the heart attack, the state of the
victim’s other vital systems and the place and circumstances of the heart attack. The fact that
heart attacks on some occasions are a linked via a physiological mechanism to a person’s death
makes a heart attack a prima facie candidate for the cause of a particular death. But to establish
8

the heart attack as a cause of death in Alf’s case, one would have to show that it made a
difference in this case. One would have to show that had Alf not had the heart attack, he would
not have died. If, for instance, Alf was suffering from sepsis and the sepsis brought about a
failure of a number of organs including the heart, and that, given all these conditions, the heart
attack did not make a difference to the death. 2 Similar arguments could be offered in response
to other cases to show that a diversity of epistemic methods does not undermine the
metaphysical position of the singularist.

3. Process Theories and Singularism
Probably the most prominent attempt to provide a positive account of the nature of singular
causal relations involves what I call process theories. 3 Process theories assert that a cause is
related to an effect via a series of processes and interactions. Processes are world-lines of
objects that propagate causal influence through space-time, while interactions involve
intersections of these world-lines in which properties of the processes are changed. Here is a
simple example: Gretchen’s throwing a baseball causes the window to break because the
motion of her throw (an interaction of the ball and arm processes) leads to the flight of the ball
(a process) that leads to the impact with the window (an interaction between the ball process
and the window process) that produces the break. Note here that the process is question is a
particular process involving particular objects at a particular place in space and time.
Process theories emerge historically as a response to difficulties with probabilistic theories
of causality. Salmon (1980) suggests such a theory is required as a response to probabilitylowering cause cases like the squirrel/golf ball scenario, and Sober’s (1984) suggestions about
token causation are also in keeping with this view. The view has been most thoroughly

2

Identifications of cause of death would seem to involve a host of pragmatic factors, including social
and legal conventions. How does one choose between proximal and distal causes, between
environmental or internal causes, between various overdetermining causes? I am inclined to think that
there is no objective answer to the question of what is “the cause of death.”
3

Process theories are sometimes called transference accounts (cf. Craver 2007) or causal-mechanical
accounts, or physical accounts. See (Dowe 2000, 2008, 2010) for a more nuanced discussion of theories in
this tradition.
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developed in the work of Wesley Salmon (1984, 1994) and, more recently, in Dowe’s conserved
quantity theory (2000). Process theorists agree that causal influence is transmitted via
processes and interactions but differ on how properly to characterize processes and
interactions. For the sake of definiteness, I will focus on Dowe’s theory, though the objections I
raise apply generally to process theories.
On Dowe’s conserved quantity theory, causal processes are world lines of objects that
possess conserved quantities, while causal interactions are intersections of causal processes in
which conserved quantities are exchanged (Dowe 2000: 90). Conserved quantities are things
like mass-energy, linear momentum and charge (ibid.: 91). Dowe characterizes his theory as a
theory of physical causation, because it seeks to define causal production, propogation and
interaction by appeal to our best physical theories. His is what he calls an empirical rather than
a conceptual analysis of cause. While a conceptual analysis tells us about the meaning and use
of causal concepts in ordinary language, an empirical analysis attempts to tell us what causation
is in the world, apart from our ways of talking about it. The idea is that our causal talk picks out
various instances of causal relations between events, and that we can look to physical theory to
find out what physical characteristics mark the relations between these causes and effects.
While process theories offer the promise of yielding a theory of singular causation, they
appear to fall victim to a series of objections involving causal relevance. The first class of
objections work by identifying sequences of processes and interactions that connect a putative
cause to an effect but which are nonetheless causally irrelevant to an effect. This sort of
objection was originally raised by Hitchcock as a criticism of Salmon’s theory, but it has been
widely discussed with a number of variations (Hitchcock 1995, Salmon 1997, Glennan 2002,
Craver 2007). A pool player chalks a cue stick, strikes the cue ball with the stick, the cue ball
strikes the eight ball, which drops into the pocket. The motions of the stick and balls are
paradigm causal processes, and the interaction of these processes involves exchanges of
conserved quantities – namely momentum. The problem raised by Hitchcock is that it might be
the case that a cue stick transfers a chalk mark from the stick to the ball and from the first ball
to the second. These transfers are interactions, presumably involving exchanges of conserved
quantities. The problem is that the transference of the chalk mark is causally irrelevant to the
outcome of the shot, so the chalking of the cue is not a cause of the sinking of the eight ball.
Examples like this can be multiplied indefinitely and point to the fact that the existence of a
10

continuous sequence of causes and interactions linking two events is not a sufficient condition
for the first event being a cause of the second.
While this first objection suggests that the existence of an a continuous sequence of
intermediate processes and interactions is not a sufficient condition for causal connection,
omission and prevention problems suggest that the condition is not necessary. In cases of
omission, it is the non-occurrence of some potential preventing cause that causes (or at least
allows) some effect to occur. For instance, my failure to turn off the alarm when I walked in the
door caused the police to come to my house. In cases of prevention, the occurrence of some
event prevents another event from occurring. For instance, my catching the vase as it topples
off the shelf prevents it from breaking on the floor. The problem with omission and prevention
is that either the putative cause (in omission) or the putative effect (in prevention) is a nonoccurrence. These non-occurrences are problematic for process theories because there can be
no set of processes that link non-occurring omissions to effects or preventive events to nonoccurring effects. This second class of objections, like the first, suggests that the process theory
fails to capture causal relevance, non-occurrences cannot be causes or effects in process
accounts, even though non-occurences can be causally relevant to effect events in omission or
cause events can be causally relevant to non-occurring effects in prevention.
A third important objection concerns what might be called the reductionist character of
process theories. Process theories are typically theories of physical causation, in the sense that
they seek to identify properties of causal connection in terms of concepts drawn from current
physics. But the great majority of causal claims made both in ordinary and scientific discourse
involve events and processes not described in the language of physics. We seem to have good
evidence for the truth of causal claims in biology, psychology, economics, history, etc. that do
not make any reference to the exchange of conserved quantities or any such concept drawn
from physical theory. In fact, there is a long history arguing for the autonomy of these higherlevel causal claims from physical theory (e.g. Fodor 1974, Kitcher 1984).These arguments
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suggest that the “gory details” at the physical level are irrelevant to the truth of causalexplanatory claims in the higher-level sciences. 4

4. The Mechanical Approach and the Process Approach
Process theories were developed largely as a response to problems that probabilistic and
other type-level theories of causation had accounting for the productive character of singular
causal relations. They addressed these problems, but at the cost of introducing problems with
causal relevance. At this point one might reasonably embrace causal pluralism and say that we
need different kinds of theories for different kinds of causes. I am sympathetic to this pluralism
to a point. There are a variety of different sort of causal concepts that have a variety of uses
within common-sense and scientific discourse, but this does not mean that there are multiple
kinds of causality in the world. A metaphysical account should ideally provide a reasonably
unified account of the nature of causation that can plausibly be connected with this variety of
causal concepts. In this section, I argue that a mechanistic approach to causation can provide
this unified account, and in particular that it can make sense both of relations of productivity
and relevance.
While the mechanical approach to causation is quite different from the process approach,
readers would be excused for thinking that processes and mechanisms come down to very much
the same thing. In my first paper on the subject (Glennan 1996), I argued that, roughly
speaking, two events were causally connected just in case there was an intervening mechanism.
This sounds very much like the process theory. Matters are not helped by the fact that some
process theorists have characterized their approach as mechanistic. Salmon (1984), for
instance, calls his approach to explanation “causal-mechanical.”

4

Dowe (2000, 2008, 2010) has discussed these objections to process theories and has offered some
correctives. Probably most importantly, Dowe insists that a theory of physical causation is just one aspect
of a multi-faceted analysis of causation. So, for instance, he argues that omissions aren’t truly causes in
the sense of physical causes, but he identifies an alternate relation of quasi-causation that attempts to
capture intuitions about causal relevance. Dowe’s pluralism allows him to argue that his conserved
quantity theory provides a correct empirical analysis of what is going on physically in causal processes,
without requiring that theory to answer all questions about conceptual, empirical and explanatory aspects
of causal relations.
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The difference between the process theory and the mechanical theory lies in their rather
different conceptions of what a mechanism is. For the process theorist, a mechanism just is a
process of the sort described by their theory. To the mechanical theorist, however, a
mechanism is a system. To get a sense of what this distinction amounts to, consider two widely
discussed attempts to characterize a mechanism.
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of
regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions (Machamer,
Darden, and Craver 2000: 3) .
and
A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior by the
interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions between parts can be
characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations(Glennan 1996: S344).
Machamer, Darden and Craver argue that mechanisms are organized and that they are
productive of regular changes. Glennan argues that mechanisms are systems of interacting
parts, where these interactions are characterized by generalizations. In both of these cases we
see that mechanisms are systems that have a certain degree of stability. If we consider, for
instance, the circulatory mechanism in vertebrates, this system contains a number of parts –
heart, arteries, capillaries, veins, and blood – that are stable in their organization and operate in
a regular way over the lifetime of an organism. A second important and shared feature of these
conceptions of mechanisms is their hierarchical character. The parts that comprise a
mechanism may themselves be complex systems whose capacities and dispositions are
explained by the regular operations of the parts’ own parts. Within the circulatory system, a
part of that system – say the heart – will have parts (valves, chambers, and so forth) and these
parts will have parts, and the parts at each level will have characteristic activities and
interactions that are productive of the behavior of the mechanism of which they are a part. On
this systems conception of mechanism, causal processes are understood as instances of the
operation of mechanical systems. The circulation of blood through a particular animal’s body is
a continual process that results from the operation of the circulatory system. 5

5

It is not plausible to suppose that all causal processes involve regular operations of a mechanical
system of this sort. The squirrel who kicks the ball against the acorn into the hole is a clear example of
such an irregular causal process. Processes of this sort are examples of what I call ephemeral mechanisms
(Glennan under review). A complete mechanistic account of causation needs to explain what these
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Both the regular and hierarchical nature of this approach to mechanisms contrasts with the
view of process theories. The process theory focuses on a single process at a single point in
space and time, as in our example of Gretchen throwing the ball and breaking the window. The
collection of entities – Gretchen, the ball and the window – do not in any ordinary sense form a
system. They do not act in a regular way to produce a repeatable behavior. The Gretchenbreaking-the-window process is also not hierarchical, because the properties that are required
to establish that Gretchen’s throw caused the window to break are basic physical properties –
exchanges of conserved quantities like momentum. It is the regular and hierarchical nature of
mechanisms that provide the resources to address relevance problems. Consider first the
example of the chalked cue stick. If we treat the situation in terms of the account of
mechanisms given in (Glennan 2002) we consider the chalk, the cue stick, the player, the two
balls, the table and the pocket as parts of a system describe the direct invariant change-relating
generalizations that describe interactions between these parts. Some of the generalizations
involved in this case would like be in the form of equations describing the change in momentum
a part as a function of the momentum of a previous part at the moment of their impact. Other
generalizations would describe the effect of the table on the ball as it rolled along the table and
was slowed by friction. The chalking would not be part of the description of the system because
changes in the chalking would not produce changes in the motion of the ball. 6
The hierarchical character of the mechanical approach is important in avoiding the objection
leveled against process accounts that the account of causation is overly reductive. Unlike the
process theories, which seek to identify a physical criterion like exchange of conserved
quantities that characterizes all physical interactions, on the hierarchical mechanical approach,
causal interactions can occur at multiple levels of organization. In a circulatory system for
instance, one characterizes an interaction between the blood (as a fluid) and the heart as an

ephemeral connections are, how they are related to mechanisms on the systems conception, and how
one can provide an account of productivity and relevance for connections mediated by such mechanisms.
6

We should note here that there is a simplification involved. I am no pool player, but I suppose that
if chalking is anything more than a ritual affectation, it does have an effect on the trajectories of balls –
presumably by making the cue surface less slippery and allowing the player to impart spin to cue balls.
So, on a careful analysis, chalking may be relevant. What couldn’t be relevant is any inadvertent coloring
of the ball.
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interaction between parts that can be characterized in terms of change-relating generalizations
describing the relationship between variables such as heart rate, blood pressure and rate of
blood flow. What makes these relationships causal is that they can be described by these
invariant generalizations of physiology. While there is a further mechanistic explanation of why
these generalizations are true, the behavior of the mechanism will be largely invariant with
respect to changes in the structure of blood and tissue at the cellular and sub-cellular level.
Craver has argued that my version of the mechanistic approach does not in fact provide a
suitable solution to the problem of causal relevance. He makes his case by providing a
description of a particular mechanism that characterizes that mechanism in terms of a set of
causally irrelevant properties. The mechanism in question is the mechanism of long-term
potentiation (LTP)— a mechanism for strengthening the connection between pre- and postsynaptic neurons by rapidly stimulating pre-synaptic neurons (Craver 2007: 92) . Craver offers a
“bizarre description” of this mechanism:
A glutamate molecule with molecular weight w crosses the synaptic cleft at velocity v,
collides with a passing protein, alters the position of amino acids in the NMDA receptor,
and lowers the concentration of Na+ in the intracellular fluid.
He goes on:
This description includes a set of parts and mechanistically explicable interactions. Each
stage is linked via a mechanism to its predecessor. Yet no one would claim this is a good
explanation of LTP. This is because the putative explanation is composed of irrelevant
features of the synapse. It is not the molecular weight of the glutamate molecule or its
velocity that matter, but rather its conformation and charge configuration… (ibid.: 92).
Craver’s strategy is just an application of Hitchcock’s chalked ball argument to a neuroscientific
example. He claims that my approach cannot rule out this bizarre description, but I think this is
incorrect. What it means to say that a feature like the velocity of a particular glutamate
molecule is irrelevant is to say (counterfactually) that if the velocity of the molecule had been
different, the mechanism would still have produced the same behavior, and to say (actually)
that the mechanism, which involves a large number of these molecules that will move across the
cleft at a variety of velocities, will produce the behavior it does in spite of these variations –
both among molecules in the synapse at a particular time and between molecules traveling
across the synapse at different times. The mechanism that produces long-term potentiation will
utilize interactions that can be characterized by invariant change-relating generalizations.
Change-relating generalizations describe functional relations between two or more variables
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where an ideal intervention on one variable will bring about a change in another variable.
According to Craver’s “correct” description of the LTP mechanism for instance, the binding of
glutamate to an NMDA receptor changes the conformation of the receptor in order to open a
channel for Ca2+ (ibid.: 70). This is an interaction between glutamate molecules and the
receptor in which one change – binding to the receptor – produces another change – opening a
channel. The reason that irrelevant characteristics, like the velocity of the glutamate model, are
not including in a description of the interactions is that the behavior of the mechanisms (and the
generalizations describing interactions between its parts) are invariant under interventions that
change these characteristics.
What appears to have happened here is that in his criticism Craver has appealed
implicitly to the Salmon-Dowe conception of an interaction, as opposed to the sort that I
advocate, in which the interactions must be interactions are part of a mechanism that produce a
particular behavior and must interact in accordance with invariant change-relating
generalizations. While the version of the mechanistic account I favor addresses the causal
relevance problem, potential objections to the mechanical theory remain. First of all, it may be,
because of the centrality of my appeal to invariant change-relating generalizations in
characterizing what constitutes a mechanism, that the mechanistic theory is in reality just a
version of Woodward’s counterfactual-based manipulability theory. Second, it may also appear
that the prominent appeal to generalizations solves the relevance problem only by moving away
from the singularist stance. I shall address the first of these concerns in section five of this
paper and the second in section six 7

5. The Mechanical Approach and the Manipulability
Approach

7

For more on how the mechanistic theory addresses the relevance problem, see (Glennan
forthcoming). That paper also discusses how the mechanistic approach handles cases of omission and
prevention.
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There has been considerable discussion in the literature about the relationship between
the mechanistic approach and counterfactual approaches to causation. In (Glennan 1996) I
argued that the mechanistic approach explained the truth conditions for counterfactuals in a
way that was more epistemically and scientifically helpful than that of Lewis (1973); but in
(Glennan 2002) I suggested that Woodward’s counterfactual account of invariant
generalizations was essential to characterizing an interaction between parts of a mechanism.
Machamer and Bogen have argued that a mechanistic approach to causation allows one to
avoid counterfactuals altogether, a point that has been criticized by Psillos, Woodward and
myself ( Bogen 2004, Glennan 2010, Psillos 2004, Woodward 2004). Woodward has suggested
that one can give a definition of a mechanism, or at least a mechanical model, in terms of
manipulability criteria(Woodward 2002). For myself, I have come to believe that the mechanical
theory and the manipulability theory – at least as it is advocated by Woodward (2003),
Pearl(2000), and Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (2000)– are not really rival theories, but rather
highlight different features of a unified conception of causation. The manipulability account
emphasizes procedures for discovery, prediction and control. The mechanical account provides
different sorts of resources for discovery and prediction, a metaphysical underpinning for the
manipulability approach and an enriched conception of causal explanation.
To understand how the manipulability theory and the mechanical theory are related, it
is necessary to examine how causal relationships are typically represented in the manipulability
theory. I base my exposition on (Pearl 2000) and (Woodward 2003), which I take to represent
different pieces of a single approach to causation 8 Pearl and Woodward assume that causal
relationships can be represented as relations between variables, where variables can either take
Boolean values representing the occurrence or non-occurrence of an event or continuous
quantities representing different values of variable magnitudes (like temperature, salinity, or
velocity). Causal relationships between variables are represented by causal models (or
structural equation models). Causal models consist of a set of exogenous variables, a set of
endogenous variables, and for each endogenous variable, a function from some subset of the

8

Woodward (2003: 38) acknowledges his debt to Pearl. As Woodward sees it, his theory is
complements Pearl’s. While Pearl is more focused on questions of inference, Woodward is more
concerned with providing explicit definitions of notions like being a total or contributing cause, and more
generally with relating Pearl’s approach to causation into the philosophical mainstream.
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variables (endogenous or exogenous) – its parents – to that variable. (Pearl 2000: 203) A causal
model will determine a directed acyclic graph (DAG). For instance, Figure 1 shows a DAG
involving two exogenous and three endogenous variables:
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U1

V1
V3

U2

V2

Figure 1: a directed acyclic graph

This graph would be determined by a causal model involving functions of the following
variables:
v1 = f1(u1, u2)
v2 = f2(u2)
v3 = f3(v1, v2)
Causal models provide a way of factoring dependence relationships among variables, so that the
value of a variable depends only upon some subset of other variables – its Markovian parents.
Parents are clearly represented in the DAG notation. We can see, for instance, that V3s parents
are V1 and V2, and that conditional on its parents, the probability of V3 will be independent of U1
and U2.
I claim that a causal model is a representation of a mechanism in the sense described in
the mechanical theory. I will argue for this by way of an example. In (Glennan 1996), one of the
examples I used of a mechanism was a toilet. A toilet is a mechanism for a certain behavior,
which for purposes of illustration we can describe as follows: When the handle is pulled, water
is released from the storage tank into the bowl, and the storage tank is refilled. Here is how the
mechanism works. Pulling the handle (H) pulls a chain (C) which opens the flapper valve at the
bottom of the tank (B1). The open flapper valve allows the water to empty out of the tank (T1),
which has two effects. First, it causes the bottom valve to close (B2) and second it causes a float
to drop (F1). The dropping of the float opens the float valve (V1) allowing water to enter the
tank. The opening of the float valve together with the closing of the flapper valve causes the
tank to fill (T2) which causes the float to rise (F2) and the float valve to close (V2). Here’s the
DAG:
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Figure 2: A DAG for a toilet mechanism

This graph is a representation of a system of parts whose interactions can be characterized by a
set of direct invariant change-relating generalizations. These generalizations will be in the form
of equations characterizing the relation between each endogenous variable and its parent or
parents (the fis). This representation does lose some information one might want in the model
of a mechanism. First, the model characterizes the mechanism with a set of binary-valued
variables. In fact the system contains some continuously varying magnitudes – the level of the
water, the amount that the valve is opened, and so on. The causal modeling approach can
however handle quantitative variables. Perhaps more importantly, the variables here do not
represent parts (like the float valve) but rather changes in the state of the parts (like the
opening or closing of the float valve). This is connected to the fact that the DAG representation
does not illustrate the cyclical nature of the toilet mechanism, in which a part like a valve begins
in a closed position, is opened, and is closed again.
If a causal model is to be a representation of a mechanism, it requires another feature,
which Woodward calls modularity. If a model is modular, it must be possible in principle to
intervene in order to change the value of a dependent variable without altering any of the other
functional relationships in the model. Modularity so defined is a property of models, but it
corresponds to an important property of the mechanisms modeled. In the case of the toilet, for
instance, the modularity condition implies that one should be able to intervene on the state of
one part and not thereby alter any of the functional relationships downstream of that part. For
instance, one ought to be able to intervene on the chain, pulling it up, and not thereby interfere
with the functional relationship between the water level and the float. Woodward offers the
following motivation for the modularity requirement:
It is natural to suppose that if a system of equations correctly and fully represents the
causal structure of some system, then those equations should be modular. One way of
motivating this claim appeals to the idea that each equation in the system should
represent the operation of a distinct causal mechanism. (Correlatively, each complete
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set of arrows directed into each variable in a directed graph should also correspond to a
distinct mechanism.) If we make the additional plausible assumption that a necessary
condition for two mechanisms to be distinct is that it be possible in principle to interfere
with the operation of one without interfering with the operation of the other and vice
versa, we have a justification for requiring that systems of equations that fully and
correctly represent causal structure should be modular. (Woodward 2003: 48)
While I have suggested that the causal model as a whole is, given the modularity assumption, a
model of a mechanism, here Woodward (cf. Pearl 2000: secs. 1.3, 7.2.4) suggests that a single
structural equation, representing the causal relationship between a node and its parent nodes
represents a “distinct causal mechanism.” So, continuing with our example, an equation
describing how pulling the chain relates to opening the flapper valve represents a distinct causal
mechanism. Thus, it is clear in this instance that what Woodward and Pearl mean by a causal
mechanism is what I have called an interaction between parts.
In another article, where Woodward responds directly to the systems account of
mechanism he understands mechanisms more in the manner of (Glennan 1996) and
(Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000). He offers the following description of a necessary
condition for a causal model to be a model of a mechanism:
(MECH) a necessary condition for a representation to be an acceptable model of a
mechanism is that the representation (i) describe an organized or structured set of parts
or components, where (ii) the behavior of each component is described by a
generalization that is invariant under interventions, and where (iii) the generalizations
governing each component are also independently changeable, and where (iv) the
representation allows us to see how, in virtue of (i), (ii) and (iii), the overall output of the
mechanism will vary under manipulation of the input to each component and changes in
the components themselves (Woodward 2002: S375).
In this characterization, the whole causal model (or directed graph) is the representation of a
mechanism. My supposition is that when Woodward says that the behavior of each part is
characterized by an invariant generalization, he really means that there are generalizations
(perhaps multiple) describing both activities (behavior of the part) and interactions (relations
between the behavior of one part and the behavior of directly connected parts). Given this
definition, his view of what constitutes a mechanical model essentially coincides with (Glennan
1992). His view is similar to that of Machamer, Darden and Craver, except that he insists,
contrary to Machamer (2004) and Bogen (2004) that the characterization of activities and
interactions between parts of mechanisms requires counterfactuals.
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It is significant that Woodward says both that causal models as a whole and equations
representing the relation between parts of a mechanical system are both representations of
mechanisms. This suggests that Woodward is in agreement with the account I sketched earlier
regarding the hierarchical character of mechanisms, and specifically with a thesis I have
defended elsewhere (Glennan 1996, 1997) that the generalizations describing the interactions
between parts of mechanisms are in most cases mechanically explicable. Consider again the
toilet mechanism. The chain connecting the lever to the flapper valve is a part of the toilet
mechanism, but it is also itself a mechanism. The chain has parts (links) whose properties and
interactions explain the behavior of the chain as a whole. Thus, an invariant change-relating
generalization describing how pulling on the top of the chain will change the position of the
bottom of the chain, will be a mechanically explicable generalization. Similarly, we can treat
each link of the chain as a part of the chain and we can describe how each link is connected via a
mechanically explicable change-relating generalization.
A final important similarity between the mechanical and manipulationist approach
concerns the understanding of the semantics and epistemology of counterfactuals. In (Glennan
1996) I argue that one of the virtues of the mechanical approach over Lewis’ counterfactual
approach is that it provides an unproblematic way to understand and evaluate counterfactuals
by reference to mechanisms. Given a model of a mechanism that exhibits the functional
dependence of variables that represent the mechanism’s parts and their properties, one
evaluates a counterfactual claim by using the model to calculate what would happen if one were
to intervene and fix the value of a variable to the antecedent of the counterfactual. For
instance, in the case of the toilet one knows that if the chain were broken then the tank would
not empty, because, if one were to intervene and break the link between C (the chain being
pulled) and B1 (the flapper valve opening), then all the events downstream of C would not
occur.
Judea Pearl (2000: ch. 7) has developed a complete analysis of what he calls “structurebased counterfactuals” that formalizes this approach in terms of structural equation models and
his “do operator.” Like Glennan (1996), Pearl sees this analysis of providing an analysis of the
truth conditions of counterfactuals that does not rely on the metaphysically extravagant and
cognitively/epistemologically problematic possible-worlds semantics of Lewis:
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In contrast with Lewis’ theory, counterfactuals are not based on an abstract notion of
similarity among hypothetical worlds; instead they rest directly on the mechanisms (or
“laws” to be fancy) that produce those worlds and on the invariant properties of those
mechanisms. Lewis’ elusive “miracles” are replaced by principled minisurgeries, do(X =
x) which represent the minimal change (to a model) necessary for establishing the
antecedent X = x (for all [values of exogenous variables] u) (Pearl 2000: 239) 9
It is revealing that Pearl so casually equates mechanisms and laws. It suggests that Pearl accepts
the view argued for in (Glennan 1996, 1997) that laws are mechanically explicable.
These observations about the relationship between my analysis of causality and the
manipulationist counterfactual approach of Woodward and Pearl should suffice to show how
the two approaches are interconnected. The mechanical approach relies on the counterfactual
approach because there is no way to define interactions between parts of mechanisms except
by appeal to counterfactual-supporting generalizations. The counterfactual approach relies on
the mechanical approach because the truth-conditions for counterfactuals depend upon the
structure of mechanisms.
Stathis Psillos (2004) has also argued for an account of causation that seeks to “harmonize”
mechanisms and counterfactuals, and most of what I have said here is consistent with Psillos’
explication of the relation between mechanisms and counterfactuals. Psillos has, however,
argued that “there is a sense in which the counterfactual approach is more basic than the
mechanistic one in that a proper account of mechanisms depends on counterfactuals while
counterfactuals need not be supported (or depend on) mechanisms” (Psillos 2004, 288). To
complete our analysis of the relationship between the mechanical and manipulationist
approaches, we need to assess Psillos’ claim.

9

The formal analysis is not without difficulties. In particular, it may strike readers as problematic that
the truth of a counterfactual claim is relativized to a model of a mechanism rather than to the mechanism
itself. Of course if we are to appeal to mechanisms to make judgments about the truth of
counterfactuals, we must inevitably rely on our models of these mechanisms, but we would like the truth
itself not to depend on our representation. A second issue has to do with background conditions. For
Pearl, a counterfactual “If it were the case that X=x, then it would be the case that Y=y” will be true only if
the model calculates Y=y for all values of background variables U. This may be too strict. For instance,
consider the counterfactual “If the flapper valve weren’t to close properly, water would keep running into
the bowl.” Intuitively, this seems to be true, but its truth depends upon a certain background condition
remaining constant, namely that the water supply to the toilet is kept on. If the water supply were
included as an exogenous variable in the model, then the counterfactual would not be true. These
complications do not seem to me to undermine the structural approach, but rather to be an inevitable
consequence of the vagueness of counterfactuals.
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The feature of my account upon which Psillos bases his claim is my claim that most but not
all causal generalizations (or laws) are mechanically explicable. According to my account, the
relationship between causes, causal generalizations and mechanisms is this: Two events are
causally connected when there is an intervening mechanism. An intervening mechanism
consists of a number of interacting parts, and these interactions are truly interactions (as
opposed to accidental correlations) because they are described by invariant change-relating
generalizations, which support counterfactuals. But if these generalizations are mechanically
explicable, then what ultimately makes it true that the parts interact is that these interactions
are produced by the operation of further, lower-level mechanisms. These mechanisms will in
turn be systems of parts interacting in accordance with invariant change-relating
generalizations, and these generalizations may too be mechanically explicable. Ultimately,
however, one will reach a level where the parts of a mechanism interact, but where there is no
further mechanism that explains this interaction. These are the fundamental interactions.
What makes it the case that these relationships are truly interactions? The answer would seem
to be that there is some basic, mechanically inexplicable, counterfactual dependence between
events, perhaps one that holds in virtue of a fundamental law. As Psillos sees it, “the presence
of a mechanism is part of a metaphysically sufficient condition for the truth of certain
counterfactuals; the fully sufficient condition includes some facts about the fundamental laws
that, ultimately, govern the behavior of the mechanism” (ibid.: 310).
Psillos is correct that the mechanical approach cannot eliminate counterfactuals, and
because of this that it cannot provide a complete and reductive analysis of causal relations. This
fact does not, however, entail Psillos’ asymmetry claim. In the first place, it appears that
counterfactuals really do need mechanisms. We have seen in the above analysis of the
manipulability theory that causal models are models of mechanisms and that in Pearl’s analysis
of the semantics of counterfactuals, their truth conditions depend upon the structure of
mechanisms. At least on Pearl’s analysis, and arguably on Woodward’s, what makes a certain
counterfactual claim true is that there is a mechanism that would respond in a certain way to a
manipulation. And like the mechanical theory, the manipulability approach faces a charge of a
prima facie circularity and uses the same strategy to respond to that circularity. Woodward, as
he himself notes (2003: 103-107), defines causal relations in terms of the outcomes of possible
interventions, and interventions are themselves kinds of causing. Woodward’s response to this
potential objection is to argue that the circularity is not vicious. To determine whether two
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variables X and Y are causally related, we must make know something about other causal
relationships (e.g., between an intervention I and X), but not about the causal relationship
between X and Y we are seeking to establish. True enough, but how do we know that an
intervention I causes a change in X? Presumably we know this because there is a mechanism
connecting I and X. This will involve further variables (representing further parts and
interactions), and how can we know that these variables are connected? By further
interventions of course! Just as the mechanist must ultimately run out of nested mechanisms,
Woodward must ultimately get to an intervention that cannot be further analyzed in terms of
interventions on further mechanisms. One is left with the brute claim that if one were to
intervene on X a change in Y would result. But this is not an analysis of the counterfactual
dependence of X and Y; it is just a restatement of it. Thus I would contend that the truth of
causal claims according to the manipulability theory will depend upon an unanalyzed notion of
counterfactual dependence.
Psillos’ argument for the asymmetry of mechanisms and counterfactuals is really an
epistemological one (Psillos 2004: 315-317). It is possible to construct a perfectly randomized
experiment that establishes a causal connection between a treatment and a control. One can
establish this connection without having any idea of what the mechanism is, and indeed, one
could establish this even if there is no mechanism, but just a brute pattern of causal
dependence. But one should not let this fact mislead one into thinking that the manipulationist
approach has provided a metaphysical grounding for causal relations any more than the
mechanistic account has. I do not think Woodward would object to this characterization of the
situation, because he is emphatic that his analysis of causation is not reductive. It does not seek
to ground the truth of causal claims in some ultimately non-causal state of affairs, but rather to
explain the relationship between certain causal claims and others. This seems like a wise idea,
especially given Woodward’s focus on causal explanation, but, like the mechanical theory,
Woodward’s theory leaves crucial metaphysical questions unanswered. These have to do with
the ultimate truth grounds for claims of counterfactual dependence at the level of fundamental
physics, where the notion of causal interaction cannot be explicated by appeal to further
mechanisms. How we understand these truth grounds will turn out to have a crucial impact on
our understanding of our original question – whether causal claims are ultimately singular.
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6. The Mechanical Approach and the grounding of singular
causal claims
We are now finally in a position to make the argument that the mechanical approach
supports a singularist view of causation. The basic reason why the mechanical approach is a
singularist one is that it suggests that causal interactions are mediated by mechanisms, and
mechanisms are particular systems of interacting parts, where these interactions occur at a
particular place and time. On this view, causal generalizations are generalizations about the
behavior of mechanisms, and they are true because mechanisms do or would behave in the way
described on actual or hypothetical occasions. The problem that remains is that our definition
of mechanism frequently makes reference to causal generalizations, and the suspicion will arise
that the truth of singular causal claims depends ultimately on the truth of these generalizations,
especially the non-mechanically explicable generalizations upon which the causal productivity of
mechanisms would ultimately seem to depend.
Because the central issue concerns the implications of the hierarchical character of
mechanisms for the status of singular causal relations, it will be helpful to have an abstract
representation of a hierarchical mechanism, as in figure 3:
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a

a2
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Figure 3: A hierarchical mechanism

The top of the diagram is a representation of two parts of a mechanism interacting. The dotted
lines represent constitutive relations and the solid arrows represent causal interactions. The
constitutive lines indicate that the part a is itself a mechanism with three parts and part b is a
mechanism with two parts, where these parts interact as indicated by the arrows. The
interaction between a and b may involve the operation of a further mechanism, as indicated by
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the parts i1 and i2. Although not pictured in this diagram, we should imagine that the parts of in
the lower level of the diagram themselves have parts, and that the arrows representing
interactions between these parts are themselves complex mechanisms with subparts. This
hierarchy of mechanisms can go a long way down but will ultimately bottom out with
fundamental parts and interactions. Imagine the parts to be atoms or corpuscles, much in the
way Descartes imagined, and that these parts have some set of basic properties (e.g., mass,
charge), interacting with each other in a manner determined by these properties. 10
To defend the singularist interpretation, we must explicate the role of causal
generalizations in this picture. The definition of a mechanism in (Glennan 2002) claims that
interactions between parts “can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating
generalizations.” What exactly are these generalizations and what is their relation to the
interaction? One reading would be to treat these generalizations as a form of causal law, and to
argue that the causal interactions are governed by these causal laws. If this were the case, the
singular causal claim, that a change in a property of a produces a change in a property of b,
would be made true by the causal law. This reading would undermine the singularist account,
but it is not consistent with the hierarchical character of mechanisms and the mechanical
explicability of these generalizations. The hierarchical picture suggests a second reading in
which change-relating generalizations are statements that “characterize” the interaction, but
the interaction itself involves the operation of the underlying mechanism and is not governed by
the generalization. For example, there might be a change-relating generalization indicating that
when I ingest caffeine, my motor activity increases. This generalization is true and reliable, but
it simply characterizes the outcome of a complex metabolic mechanism.

10

A problem that I can only allude to here has to do with the implications of quantum mechanics for
how we understand fundamental interactions. The picture I offer of a fundamental interaction is
essentially a classical Cartesian/Newtonian one. Indeterminism in quantum mechanics raises some
problems for this picture. More significant though are problems raised by the measurement problem and
by violations of locality. The mechanistic picture seems to require bottom-level interactions that are local
and have definite properties independent of measurement. I don’t have anything constructive to say
about this problem. I can only offer as consolation the fact that except under special conditions quantum
mechanical peculiarities wash out as one gets past sub-atomic scales. Wherever this point is, we can treat
it as the fundamental level with respect to the hierarchy of mechanisms.
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Ontologically, the crucial point to observe is that mechanisms are not universals but
particulars. They are structured collections of parts which occupy a certain region of space and
which interact over a certain definite period of time. We characterize these mechanisms by
generalizations because very often a mechanism’s behavior is repeatable. My body is a
mechanism that on repeated occasions interacts with coffee, and coffee repeatedly and reliably
has an effect on my behavior. Not only does the very same mechanism exhibit repeatable
behavior, but particular mechanisms may be instances of types with consistent behavior. My
metabolic mechanisms are broadly similar to those of other human beings and, as a
consequence, there will be generalizations (say about the ingestion of caffeine) that hold true of
my body and the bodies of many others. But these generalizations are true in virtue of the fact
that these mechanisms can and do operate in particular ways on particular occasions, rather
than conversely. This understanding of these generalizations also accounts for why they always
involve approximations and are only true ceteris paribus.
This explanation of the role of causal mechanisms is available so long as the generalizations
are mechanically explicable, but here we come to what may seem the key metaphysical issue. If
mechanisms are truly going to explain how one event produces another, all of the interactions
between parts, at all levels in the hierarchy of mechanisms, will need to be genuinely causally
productive. If it were to turn out that these interactions at the fundamental level were not truly
interactions, then none of the putative causal relations mediated by mechanisms would be
genuine (cf. Psillos 2004, Craver 2007).
We are now concerned with an interaction between two (or more) parts at the bottom of a
mechanistic hierarchy. These parts interact (by hypothesis) in accordance with a changerelating generalization or law. But how are we to understand the relationship between the
generalization and this interaction? There seem to be three main metaphysical possibilities:
1) Humean Lawlessness – The interaction nothing more than an instance of a pattern that
is described by a generalization.
2) Nomological Determination – The interaction is governed by the generalization (law).
3) Singular Determination – The interaction is a singular case of causal determination and
any generalizations describing interactions are true in virtue of there being a general
pattern of such singular instances.
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The first view is the position that fits most naturally with the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis (MRL) view of
laws. 11 On this view, laws are statements that provide the best balance of simplicity and
strength in characterizing events within the world. If there are (as there appear to be in our
world) a relatively small number of kinds of fundamental-level parts and some relatively simple
generalizations describing how these parts behave in relation to each other, then these
generalizations would be obvious candidates for MRL laws. This small set of laws, together with
a much larger volume of information about how these parts are organized into hierarchies of
mechanisms, will provide a simple and powerful description of the pattern of events in the
world. I borrow the term “Humean Lawlessness” from Stephen Mumford (2004), who argues
persuasively, that the MRL laws aren’t truly laws, because they supervene on particulars of the
actual world. They describe a pattern, but they do not create or explain the pattern. Such a
view is anti-realist with respect both to laws and to causes.
The second view – nomological determination – holds that holds fundamental
interactions are governed by laws. This view requires some form of nomological realism about
fundamental laws, such as the Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley (ADT) view. A law on this view is some
third metaphysically real entity, apart from the particular events, which makes it true that one
event produces the second. Causal relations are real but subordinate to nomological relations.
The third view, singular determination, holds that there are genuine interactions
between parts at the bottom of the mechanistic hierarchy, but that these parts are not
governed by laws. In calling these interactions genuine, I am suggesting that the relationship is
a modal one. We can express the modality of the relationship counterfactually: When a change
in a produces a change in b, it follows (with the usual caveats about overdetermination, etc.)
that if a had not changed, b would not have changed. But the counterfactual locution should be
understood not as a claim about non-actual worlds, but a claim about the determining power of
a in this world. The singular determination view is the view that is consistent with Anscombe’s
and Ducasse’s arguments for singular determination, in the sense that it supports the basic idea
that whether a particular event (or change in an object) causes another is at bottom a fact about
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There has been a good deal of recent literature on alternate interpretations of laws of nature,
including the MRL and ADT views. Two helpful introductions are (Psillos 2003) and (Carroll 2008).
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the relationship between these two events and is ultimately independent of any facts about
other events.
Because the mechanistic approach to causation requires that there be genuine causal
connections between parts all of the way down the mechanistic hierarchy, it appears that the
question of whether or not the mechanistic approach is a genuinely singularist one would
essentially depend upon which of these metaphysical options is correct. If Humean lawlessness
is operative at the fundamental level, then mechanisms are simply parts of the pattern of events
in the world and they cannot imbue relations between those events with any genuine sort of
causal necessity. Alternatively, if fundamental interactions are governed by fundamental laws,
then the truth of all claims about productive relations between entities at any level in a
mechanistic hierarchy will depend upon these laws. Finally, if causal relationships between
events at the fundamental level involve singular determination, then so too will events at all
levels of the mechanistic hierarchy.
Each of these metaphysical possibilities is genuine in the sense that each of them is
consistent with the pattern of objects and events that both science and common experience
reveal in the world. If this is the case, which of them should we accept? One approach would
be to reject this question as meaningless on the grounds that the options are not empirically
distinguishable. While I am not entirely unsympathetic to this sort of anti-metaphysical
response, I do think there are arguments that may lend credence to one or more of these
metaphysical positions. I cannot hope to survey the many arguments that have been offered in
support or criticism of these positions. I can only offer here some explanation of why I think the
metaphysic of singularist determination fits naturally with the mechanistic approach to
causation that I have argued for.
In the first place, it is difficult to reconcile our intuitions about manipulation, which are
central to the mechanistic view, with the Humean view. On the Humean view there is no such
thing as genuine modal relationships (or necessary connections as Hume would say) between
events. Moreover, singular counterfactual claims are not really claims about what would have
happened in a single case. Causal and counterfactual expressions are elliptical ways of talking
about complicated patterns in the experience of the actual world. Because of this,
manipulations or interventions are not modally effective ways to change the world; they are
simply part of the pattern of the actual world. Manipulation, like all other forms of causing, is
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shown to be a fiction of the human mind. What patterns or regularities there are in the world
just are. There are no explanatory principles to account for them. I concur with Mumford’s
summary judgment of this sort of metaphysical view – “irrefutable, but neither compelling,
appealing nor intuitive” (Mumford 2004: 33). What I think makes it unappealing and nonintuitive is that it is inconsistent with the belief that we manipulate things and cause things in
the single case.
The main argument in favor of the nomological determination view is simply that it is
implausible to suppose that the order and regularity that we find in nature would exist without
laws. 12 Suppose, for the sake of illustration, that patterns of gravitational attractions between
bodies are correctly described by the generalizations we call Newton’s laws of motion and the
law of universal gravitation, and furthermore that these generalizations are not mechanically
explicable. Statements of these laws collectively entail certain claims about regular patterns of
behavior in the objects – for instance, that satellites will travel around planets in elliptical orbits.
It seems quite reasonable, the defender of nomological determination would contend, that
these objects behave as they do because they are governed by these general laws. If these laws
do not govern their instances, there would be no explanation for the existence of this regularity
in nature.
In response to this argument, the singularist must contend that in each particular
interaction, the change in one entity produces a change in the other entity, and the fact of this
productive relationship does not depend in any way on a general relationship between
properties or instances. In the gravitational case, each body acts in each instant on the other
body, producing accelerations which, over time, produce elliptical orbits. We do live in a world
in which fundamental interactions fit within general patterns, but from this it does not follow
that it is in virtue of falling under those patterns that the productive relationship holds. It is
possible that we could live in a higgledy-piggledy world in which causes determined effects but
in which these determination relations were not regular. 13

12

This is what Mumford (2004: ch. 5) refers to as the nomological argument.

13

Not all will agree. Heathcote and Armstrong (1991: 63-73), from whom I borrow the term
“higgledy-piggledy world”, conclude that this situation , while conceivable, is not possible, and that there
is an a posteriori necessary connection between laws and causes.
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One potential source of confusion has to do with the relevance of properties to
causation. A proponent of nomological determination would point out that causal relations
appear to hold in virtue of properties of the related events. For instance, the ringing of the
alarm clock caused me to wake in virtue of its loudness. Thus, if one takes laws to be relations
between properties, it may seem natural to infer that causes depend upon laws. The singularist,
however, can argue that on a particular occasion a causal relation between events may hold in
virtue of certain properties of those events but not hold to a nomological theory of causation
The singularist does not deny the importance of properties in characterizing causal relations, but
insists that it is not essential to causal relations that the relationship between cause and effect
be the same on different occasions.
This argument is moreover bolstered by the mechanistic view on the nature of
properties and their relations to objects. I have argued (Glennan forthcoming) that much of the
literature on causation and laws suffers from a property bias – a tendency to think of causal
relations as relations between properties without recognizing how properties themselves
depend upon particulars. Consider for example a property of butter – whether it is in a solid or
liquid state. Butter is not a basic substance, but a combination of a number of different types of
fats – saturated and unsaturated. Whether a fat is saturated or not is in turn dependent upon
the molecular structure of the fat. When we say that heating the butter will cause the butter to
melt, this is, on the face of it, a change-relating generalization involving properties – changing
the temperature of the butter will change the solid/liquid state of the butter. But the properties
themselves are not basic facts about the substance butter, but depend instead upon the
particular structure of the butter – the molecules that make it up and their arrangement, as well
as the arrangement and bonding of sub molecular structures within these fat molecules. One
consequence of this is that there is no such property as the melting point of butter. Different
samples of butter will have different kinds and proportions of fat molecules which will have
different consequences for their interaction with heat.
This point about properties applies only to higher-level properties. If an object has
fundamental properties like mass and charge whose presence or causal role cannot be
explained by reference to the organization and interaction of parts of that individual, then we
cannot show how those properties depend upon particulars. For this reason, the observation
about property bias is not decisive at the fundamental level. In favor of the singularist
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interpretation of fundamental interactions we can only say that it has the advantage of
providing a consistent picture of the role of properties and laws in characterizing causal
relations.
Where does this all leave us with regard to our original question about the relationship
between singular and general causal relations? If the argument has succeeded it has shown that
a mechanistic approach to causation is consistent with a singularist causal metaphysics. This is
so even though causal generalizations are part and parcel of the apparatus we use to describe
and manipulate mechanisms and to formulate causal explanations. Moreover, the singularist
picture is the simplest one for the defender of a mechanistic approach to causation, because it is
fits most naturally with the view that the causal mechanisms which are the truth-makers for
causal claims operate at particular locations in space and time. One of the virtues of the
mechanistic approach to causation is that it at once fits nicely with a singularist metaphysics and
explains the centrality of causal generalization to our epistemic and explanatory practices.
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